Russia Is on the Way to Repeating the Fate of some Latin American Countries
Following Russia’s somewhat excessive response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia, Dmitry Medvedev has no choice but to accept the de jure independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But in reality, such an acceptance is not in Russia’s interests, as it will only further undermine foreign investor confidence and provoke retaliation from other geopolitical players—too high of a price to pay for a political statement.
The valiant Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh, on behalf of his people, turned to Russia with a request for de jure recognition of the republic. In the coming days, the South-Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity will come forth with the same request. And Dmitry Medvedev will face a new challenge. This challenge is a direct and inevitable consequence of the only possible solution to the previous problem, not generated but accepted by him.
We can recall for as long as we like how, in the era of the previous administration, our elites teased the Georgians, economically appropriated the Abkhaz territory and took matters into their own hands. We can look even deeper and discuss Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s fateful decision to abolish the South-Ossetian autonomy. Or we can scold our own KGB and GRU agents who, out of a personal hatred for Shevardnadze, provoked an ethnic cleansing by the Abkhazians and pushed the Georgians toward the Sukhumi slaughter. Or, vice versa, we can concentrate on the present and have an academic discussion: was Mikheil Saakashvili provoked to a military attack or not? But why? These are just historical milestones, marks of our common descent to the bottom. We fall to a new level, hold on for a bit, and fall further. We hold on again, and again we fall. We cannot go back to 1992. Gamsakhurdia is dead. You cannot reverse Saakashvili’s August decision. But that is why he is the sovereign president, in order to distinguish provocations from real actions. And to be held responsible for the deeds committed.
What is important now is altogether different. After the Georgian president gave the order to fire, and after the killing of peacekeepers, the young Russian leader’s options were limited by a narrow corridor of bad and extremely bad decisions. One option is to hopelessly beg the uncontrollable army to limit itself to retaliatory fire and the extrusion of Georgian forces from Ossetian territory, but the army will obviously not oblige, and then an internal military coup will take place in Russia. Or give into the demands of the angered army, and get caught up in a large Caucasian meat grinder. Or better yet, to respond to the challenge -- forcefully, but in a limited capacity, maneuvering between the combat fervor of your own generals and the cold pragmatism of real politics, assuming full moral and political responsibility for what is happening, and gradually taking control of the situation.
Medvedev chose the latter, and one way or another managed to impose his wording on the military: coercion to peace, and not payback, not revenge, not war. And this is more or less the only positive consequence of the terrible August days.
Yes, Russia obviously went well beyond the means necessary for self-defense, with massive raids deep into Georgian territory and the shelling of Gori and Poti, letting Yamadayev’s commandos off the chain. This has nothing to do with the task of defending Tskhinvali. Yes, the commanding officers refused to obey the six points of the peace plan and held in Western Georgia until the last moment. Nevertheless, full scale slaughter did not occur. The last barrier was not broken. And, therefore, there remains a chance for a peaceful, worthy, and dignified outcome.
As for the chances of Medvedev not being forced to recognize Abkhazia and Ossetia as fast as possible: they are null. The situation sunk to another political level, and here in mid-drop, new challenges await us.
What price did we, nay, the whole world, pay for the unraveling of this military plot?
Externally: the wavering stopped wavering. Terrified at their possible fate, they rushed to the Americans’ embrace. It is useless to try to tell the Poles, the Czechs, and the Ukrainians that Saakashvili started it, even though he really did start it, and hundreds of civilians are on his political conscience. Neighbors saw the response and that sufficed. From now on, NATO will expand much faster than we want, and the CIS will collapse much sooner than it could have otherwise. America got everything it wanted.
In Georgia: Saakashvili's opposition bit its tongue, and it will be long before they can speak again. For the nation he is a hero: he tried to recover the lost territories and was then able to negotiate with the mighty for protection from Russia.
In Russia: although Medvedev (temporarily?) seized the power, no longer being the first at the helm of the second, which is good, domestic policy took a forced turn. Mass consciousness spun into hysteria, as if into a funnel. Undoing the nuts and bolts will be much more difficult; saving the sinking stock market and ensuring an influx of capital is an inconceivable task. The danger that the owner’s last name will be new and different while the politics remains the same is increasing.
Both here and there the world’s media have plunged into the epoch of the Cold War. I did not watch Georgian television, but Western newsmakers were almost completely silent about the situation in Ossetia, while ours paraded the tears of Ossetian mothers to sad music, but no Gori, no Poti, nor any direct translation of speeches by Western leaders, only shown in parody. Both here and there we find exceptions to the rule (CNBC, Vesti-24), but they are extremely rare. And while some ponder the West’s victory in the informational war – don’t. This is our mutual defeat.
So here we are. After everything that happened, Bagapsh and Kokoity could not have avoided turning to Russia with their fateful requests. Fateful, because for Russia’s real goals the legal recognition (or non-recognition) of Abkhazia and Ossetia is not needed; Russia in the 21st century is called on to accrue population, not territories, especially if we have to pay an exorbitant price for them. And pay we will, with a further deterioration of our positions in the world (disregarding as “positions” our friendship with Hugo Chavez and the doomed partnership with Ahmed Ahmadinejad). With the bleeding out of investments. With the vengeance of powerful geopolitical players, who, in response, will begin to shake our unsteady borders, just as we shook Georgia’s. And with the descent of the internal political situation to a new low. Harder. Rougher. In epaulets. If the FSB is now seriously telling us that Georgian special services were preparing a terrorist war inside Russia, while the media trustingly carries on about undercover blacks within the ranks of the Georgian army, then what is still to come, after we take another plunge? We will say this to console the domestic propagandists: during the war of 1812, the Cossack General Matvey Platov had a black servant who was also, in a certain sense, a Cossack; you can safely direct your audience to this historical precedent, it will appear truer.
How many times has this already happened in the history of the 20th century: imitating America beyond realistic means and contrary to historical designation destroyed the imitators. We will not even talk about the Soviet Union, we are not there yet. But what about half of the other America, the Latin one? Have we learned nothing from them? Do we want to be increasingly similar to present-day Argentina, which failed to rise? Or like modern Venezuela, which – even with immense oil reserves - would die of hunger if not for Colombian groceries? I repeat: if the recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia helped to meet Russia’s global challenges, pushed it to self-development, and promised a chance for valuable and modern improvements, then that would be a different story. Then we would need to pull ourselves together and pay the price. But this only serves the interests of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali (Sukhum and Tskhinval, if some prefer it this way). It is similar to the sale of a ton of mandarins at the price of gold reserves.
Bagapsh and Kokoity are right in their own way. But that does not concern us. If expedited recognition does occur, then we – not they – will have to answer nasty questions. With regard to Abkhazia: how can they be recognized without a real, not mock, referendum? That is, a referendum in which all residents of the territory, at the time of its separation, can take part. What kind of referendum would it be without the Georgians, who have lived in Abkhazia until 1992 inclusively? With regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia: it is interesting to consider what legal merit would the vote of Russian citizens (over 90 percent of their populations have Russian citizenship) have in relation to separating territory from Georgia.
Of course, you can also pose an interesting question to NATO forces as well: in what composition do you intend to accept Georgia? In its truncated form? Within the framework of the 1992 agreement? Then you acknowledge, de facto, its disintegration – and take part of the responsibility for what is happening off Russia. And if in its full form, then what? Place troops and weapons in Tskhinvali, the Kodori Gorge, and Sukhumi? Well-well, just try and do that. However, it is not up to us to get caught up in these answers, but up to them; let them solve this puzzle. We only have to answer our own questions.
Medvedev cannot refuse Abkhazia and Ossetia. But he does not have enough political power; that would be akin to suicide. Heroic, perhaps, but useless. To recognize them – means he will face new challenges; and every time it will be increasingly difficult to stay off the slippery slope. Actually, if he does not want to become a second edition of his predecessor, he has one chance. Tie up the situation in legal red tape. Tangle it in procedures and definitions. Procrastinate until the last moment. And try to bunker down in the mutually achieved lowland. In order to, maybe, one day, begin to rise.
There is a relevant anecdote. A little boy comes to his father, a computer specialist, and asks him: dad, why does the sun rise and set, every day? The dad, immersed in solving a complex programming problem, absent-mindedly asks: it rises? it sets? every day? and it never gets thrown off? Stand still and don’t touch anything!
A very appropriate tale.
Feedback:
William Schell: I enjoyed the article "Freeze. Don't Touch anything." I would like to ask you some questions. I am a 55-year-old American. I do not understand why Russia can not have many easy going trade, economic and tourist relationships with its former satellite countries. What I hear from the people of these countries is that they are afraid of being overrun, punished, and controlled by Russia. I think that their desire to be part of NATO or the EU is not to be overly friendly with the countries of these organizations, but to try to protect themselves from an overbearing neighbor. I would like to read your opinion.
